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HIGHWAY SAFETY
Kathryn Dobie
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
William A. Cunningham 
Air Force Institute of Technology
The signing of the NAFTA agreement signaled the beginning of increased efforts to harmonize trade between 
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Unfortunately the harmonization of transportation links is lagging far behind 
proposed implementation dates. This narrative describes the highway safety, and concerns expressed by 
highway safety advocates and Teamsters union representatives, and documented by the GAO. The authors 
propose a market based alternative to restricting transborder traffic to the narrow commercial zone presently 
in place.
INTRODUCTION
The signing of the NAFTA agreement in December 
1993 marked the beginning of a new era in North 
American trade relations. However, the benefits of 
these new trade relationships hinge on free access to 
markets. While the intent of the NAFTA agreement 
was to lower and in time to virtually eliminate 
political and legal barriers to trade, the physical 
barriers to the cross-border flow of goods remain 
problematic. One physical barrier to the free flow of 
goods is the lack of adequate infrastructure. It will 
take a commitment and considerable financial 
investment to alleviate this problem. The second 
barrier is the unwillingness and/or inability of many 
Mexican transportation providers, specifically motor 
carriers, to meet U.S. safety and operating 
standards. Expressing concerns that the planned 
December 1995 opening of the four U.S. and six 
Mexican border states to the free flow of traffic 
would compromise the safety of American highways, 
Teamsters Union representatives and highway 
safety groups advocated that the border states not be 
opened until the safety issue was rectified. As a 
result President Clinton opted not to open the border 
states to the free flow of traffic as had been 
scheduled under the NAFTA agreement.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the 
safety concerns which have precipitated the present 
conflict over the advisability of opening the border 
states to unrestricted transportation movement or of 
continuing to restrict movement to the narrow 
commercial zone currently in place will be presented. 
Secondly, the short and long term economic 
implications of opening the border for the free 
movement of motor carriers for both Mexican and 
U.S. shippers and carriers will be discussed.
Following an overview of the progress toward 
opening the border, the factors which have been 
identified as contributing to the accident rate of 
motor carriers will be examined. Data regarding 
out-of-service violations for Mexican motor carriers 
will then be compared to the identified accident 
contribution factors. This will provide the necessary 
background for extending the discussion to the 
specific economic impact of motor carrier safety and 
the implementation of NAFTA provisions for the free 
access of motor carriers to markets in all areas of 
North America.
SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW
The Government Accounting Office has conducted 
two studies examining the state of safety inspections 
and safety inspection procedures at the U.S./Mexican
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border crossings in California, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and Texas. The first report, issued February 29, 
1996, focused on providing an update on the status 
of harmonizing safety regulations, operating and 
enforcement practices, and the readiness of state and 
federal agencies to enforce compliance with U.S. 
trucking regulations (“Commercial Trucking,...” 
1996). It was felt that these represented the greatest 
impediment to implementing the first phase of the 
NAFTA agreement which expands the free access 
trade zone of the U.S./Mexican border (Exhibit 1) to 
the total area of the ten border states (Exhibit 2). 
The data for this report was collected between June 
1995 and Jan. 1996.
EXHIBIT 1
CURRENT COMMERCIAL ZONE
EXHIBIT 2
TEN STATE ACCESS-DECEMBER 18, 1995
At the time that this report was issued, it was 
determined that enough progress had not been made 
to justify expanding cross border traffic beyond the 
existing commercial zone. Specific concerns which 
were highlighted included the incompatibility of 
trucking regulations between the U.S. and Mexico 
(Exhibit 3), the lack of uniform enforcement practices 
between the U.S. and Mexico (Exhibit 4), the lack of 
inspection facilities on the U.S. side of the border 
(Exhibit 5), and the lack of inspection on the Mexican 
side of the border. The numbers of Mexican truckers 
whose vehicles have been restricted from highway 
service until safety violations have been remedied 
has ranged from 50 to 63 percent. This high rate of 
safety violations has been cited by political, union, 
and consumer groups as a major cause for concern.
EXHIBIT 3
INCOMPATIBILITY OF TRUCKING 
REGULATIONS
Regulation U.S. Mexico
Driver Hours of 
Service
10 per day None
Log Books Required Not Required
Computerized
Driver
Records
Required Not Required
Vehicle
Front Brakes Required Not Required
Gross Vehicle 
Weight
80,000 lbs. 97,000 lbs.
Single Axle
Weight
20,000 lbs. 22,000 lbs.
Tandem Axle 
Weight
34,000 lbs. 39,600 lbs.
*GAO/RCED 96-61 Commercial Trucking Under 
NAFTA, p. 20.
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EXHIBIT 4
DIFFERENCES IN ENFORCEMENT 
PRACTICES
U.S. Mexico
Federal Motor Carrier Commercial Vehicle
Safety Regulations Safety Alliance 
(1991)
Motor Carrier Safety Educational Inspection
Assistance Program Activity (1993)
Commercial Vehicle Little to no
Safety Alliance Enforcement
Fines for Violations Fines for Violations 
Virtually Non­
existent
In April 1997, the GAO issued a second report 
concerning the progress made toward satisfying the 
safety and inspection standards necessary to 
implement the opening of
EXHIBIT 5
U.S. INSPECTION FACILITIES
California (24% of traffic)
Permanent Inspection Facilities at Otay Mesa 
and Calexico
Texas (66% of traffic)
No Permanent Inspection Facilities
Arizona (10% of traffic)
No Permanent Inspection Facilities
was to take a more detailed look at border inspection 
facilities and practices in an effort to determine if 
progress had been made toward the goal of 
harmonizing and enforcing safety standards between 
the U.S. and Mexico. The results of the study 
indicated that California, with 24% of the truck 
traffic from Mexico, was by far the most proactive of 
the states in implementing inspection procedures. 
The inspection facilities in Texas, with 66% of the 
total truck traffic, and Arizona, with 10% of the total 
truck traffic, were woefully inadequate and in some 
border areas non-existent. In addition, DOT 
programs to train inspectors on the Mexican side of 
the border had not produced any measurable results.
MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
Attention to the issue of motor carrier safety is not a 
new phenomenon. The public, state highway 
administrators, DOT officials, shippers, and motor 
carriers alike have been concerned about safety 
issues for various reasons. Concerns have revolved 
around such issues as actual physical safety, the 
possibility of infrastructure damage, costs of 
operation, and the importance of the exchange of 
undamaged goods between shipper and customer 
(Brandt, 1997; “Mexico’s NAFTA,...”1997; “NAFTA 
Inspires NAII,...” 1996). These same issues were 
raised following enactment of the Motor Carrier Act 
of 1980. At that time public interest advocates 
focused on the possibility that safety performance 
had changed due to the new operating environment 
and the number of new entrants in the industry. 
There was public criticism of the rate of highway 
accidents involving poorly maintained trucks 
(O’Neill, 1987). This was blamed on the lack of fines 
and other penalties being imposed on safety violators 
by the Federal Highway Administration's Office of 
Motor Carriers. Even with the shortage of 
inspectors, 30-40% of trucks that were inspected 
were cited for serious safety violations involving 
brakes, tires, and the size and weight of the load 
(Loos and Labich, 1987).
Academic researchers who studied this problem 
the border states to the free movement of truck found that newer carriers with little experience in
traffic (“Commercial Trucking,...” 1997). By this the motor carrier industry had significantly higher
time, the original target date for implementation, accident rates (Corsi, Fanara and Jarrell, 1988;Corsi
December 18, 1995, had already been postponed for and Grimm, 1987). They also reported a higher
over a year. The focus was on inspection procedures incidence of reported accidents involving
and safety enforcement along the border areas and owner-operators. This was attributed to a general
federal strategies to ensure the compliance with U.S. lack of experience and inadequate maintenance,
safety standards by Mexican truckers. The intent
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While these studies identified populations in the 
motor carrier industry who might be more prone to 
accidents, they did not identify the factors which 
were most likely to contribute to the incidence of 
motor carrier accidents. Bruning specifically 
attempted to identify those factors most often 
associated with motor carrier accidents (Bruning, 
1989). The factors which had the greatest positive 
correlation with motor carrier accidents were driver 
longevity and experience (.01 level of significance), 
equipment defects (.05 level of significance), age of 
the equipment (.10 level of significance), and the size 
and financial stability of the carrier (.01 level of 
significance). From this study, it could be concluded 
that the profile of the carrier least likely to pose a 
safety hazard would be larger, financially sound, 
with newer, well maintained equipment and 
experienced drivers. Interestingly, this study did not 
find a significant relationship between accident rates 
and whether or not the driver was self employed, e.g. 
an owner-operator.
A similar effort investigated the role that excessive 
speed and driver training played in the incidence of 
accidents (Beilock and Capelle, 1989). Two 
contributors to excessive speed identified in this 
study were thrill seeking and the over estimation of 
personal abilities or vehicle capabilities. Thrill 
seeking and the underestimation of personal abilities 
may be conceivably linked to the lack of experience 
identified by Bruning. The likelihood of 
overestimating vehicle performance capabilities may 
be linked to both driver inexperience and the 
condition and age of the vehicle. While these studies 
have focused on different factors it is plain that those 
factors are not mutually exclusive.
The preceding studies, conducted in an effort to 
determine the factors affecting highway accident 
rates for U.S. carriers, are as applicable as they were 
when they were conducted. Factors contributing to 
higher numbers of safety violations, e.g. driver 
inexperience, equipment safety violations, equipment 
age and the financial status of the company, apply to 
Mexican carriers as well as the U.S. carriers that 
were originally surveyed. A survey of the out-of- 
service data collected during the GAO investigation 
of border area safety violations illustrates this point.
EXAMINATION OF OUT-OF-SERVICE DATA
The average monthly out-of-service rate for U.S. 
trucks inspected during fiscal year 1995 was 28% 
while the average out-of-service rate for Mexican
trucks entering the U.S. was 45%. The difference in 
the rate of trucks being restricted from highway 
service until safety violations are corrected serves to 
underscore the concerns that opening the border 
states might lead to an increase in safety related 
accidents. However, these figures may overstate the 
difference between the numbers of U.S. carriers 
sidelined for safety violations and the numbers of 
Mexican carriers sidelined for safety violations. The 
Mexican sample consisted of over 25,000 inspections 
out of about 3 million trucks. This sample was 
primarily selected according to how likely the truck 
was to be in violation. In addition, since Mexican 
trucks are only allowed to travel within the narrow 
commercial zone, they are most likely to be dray age 
vehicles which make several trips across the border 
in a single day. In contrast, the 1.8 million trucks 
inspected in the U.S. sample represent a more 
general cross section of the motor carrier population. 
Safety violation data for drayage operations is not 
available separately from inspection data for the 
motor carrier population as a whole.
The GAO categorized the violations that were 
commonly observed during the inspection of trucks 
entering the U.S. from Mexico into four areas. (See 
Exhibit 6)
Two of these categories, equipment deficiencies and 
lack of driver qualifications were specifically 
identified in Bruning's study as being significant 
contributors to accidents. The third category, cargo, 
could conceivably affect the handling quality and 
performance of the vehicle. In addition, weight 
factors have a detrimental effect on roads and 
bridges which may indirectly contribute to accidents. 
The final category is of importance in terms of 
financial responsibility, but does not directly affect 
truck safety.
DISCUSSION
It is important for transportation managers to 
consider the consequences of opening the 
U.S./Mexican border to the free flow of motor carrier 
traffic. Safety is an issue that cannot be over 
emphasized. From the information presented by the 
GAO, it appears that due to inadequate inspection 
facilities and the continuing high rate of safety 
standard violations, the limited commercial zone 
rules should not be expanded. Using GAO figures, 
the Teamsters and highway safety advocates have 
actively lobbied for the status quo.
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short-sighted view since cooperation in enforcing 
EXHIBIT 6 safety standards for motor carriers on both sides of
COMMON SAFETY VIOLATIONS the border should result in safer highways for both
Mexico and the U.S..
Equipment Structural Cracks
Poor Suspension
Faulty Tires
Non-Working Brakes 
Non-Working Lights
Steering Problems
Faulty Exhaust Systems 
Leaky Fuel Tanks 
Non-Functioning
Emergency Equipment
Driver Invalid Licenses
Under Age
Ix)gbook
Language
Drug Testing
Cargo Overweight
Not Secured Properly 
Hazardous Material Not 
Secured Properly
Other Insurance
However, The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, 
an association of federal, state and province officials 
and industry representatives who are responsible for 
motor carrier safety laws in the U.S., Canada and 
Mexico, maintain that the truck safety enforcement 
community is prepared to handle the levels of cross- 
border traffic which would result when the 
commercial trade zone is increased to include the 
border states.
The most obvious way to deal with truck safety 
appears to be through inspection programs. With its 
aggressive enforcement program, California seems to 
have achieved a high degree of compliance. Thus, 
one could conclude that the same results could be 
achieved in Texas and Arizona if the same level of 
effort was expended. The situation on the Mexican 
side of the border appears to be as inadequate as that 
on much of the U.S. border area. Presently Mexican 
officials have taken the stance that any inspection 
activity will be directed toward carriers entering 
Mexico, not leaving. This would seem to be a
On the surface, it would appear that increased 
inspection levels would lead to greater numbers of 
trucks being detained in inspection facilities. These 
delays translate into additional costs to carriers and 
shippers. However, the certainty of inspection and 
resulting penalties for safety violations inherent in 
increased inspection levels should encourage carriers 
and operators to conform to safety regulations. The 
present situation where traffic is restricted to a 
narrow commercial zone disrupts U.S. and Mexican 
firms who are unable to efficiently transport goods, 
and motor carriers who are unable to compete in new 
and potentially profitable markets. The question 
that must be answered is what are the probable 
consequences if the long-delayed opening of the ten 
U.S. and Mexican border states is implemented.
Immediate Consequences of Expanding the 
U.S./Mexican Commercial Zone
In the short term, the decision to open the 
U.S./Mexican border to the free flow of 
transportation will not necessarily change the way 
things are being done. Several factors support this 
argument. First, U.S. motor carriers have already 
formed alliances with those Mexican carriers who 
provide the best opportunities for mutually beneficial 
relationships. These alliances would be adversely 
affected if the U.S. carrier were to begin to compete 
directly in the same freight lanes. In addition, 
drivers for these U.S. carriers are ill-prepared to 
operate in the Mexican environment with its unique 
language, cultural, physical, and legal 
characteristics. U.S. motor carriers are already 
struggling with the task of maintaining a qualified 
driver force to meet their present service needs and 
might find it difficult to field the driver force 
necessary to expand their service areas.
A second factor which would inhibit short-term 
changes in cross-border transportation operations is 
the nature of existing truck traffic. The 
preponderance of trucks originating in Mexico 
engage in drayage operations. They are not poised 
to capitalize on longer distance market opportunities 
due to the nature of their business emphasis, the 
inadequacy of their equipment, and the lack of 
trained drivers capable of meeting U.S. licensing 
standards.
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There are fears that if the next phase in the NAFTA 
agreement were to be implemented that U.S. carriers 
would hire large numbers of Mexican drivers to take 
advantage of lower wage rates. In the short term 
this does not seem to be feasible. Considering the 
differences in driver education, training, and 
licensing requirements, unfamiliarity with the 
language, conventions, and safety regulations of the 
U.S., and green card restrictions, it is unlikely that 
U.S. motor carriers will be able to hire Mexican 
drivers in any numbers. In fact, given the long term 
nature of the driver shortage in the U.S., if hiring 
Mexican drivers had been an acceptable option for 
alleviating this situation, Mexican drivers would 
already constitute a visible contingent of the U.S. 
driver force.
Looking Toward the Future
In the long term, the element which seems to have 
been overlooked by government officials and various 
proponents and opponents to opening the border for 
a free flow of motor carriers is the impact that the 
market has on carrier performance. U.S. motor 
carriers have found that safety plays an important 
part in their bottom line performance (Siegel, 1992; 
“Safety and Service,” 1990). This is due to direct 
savings in driver turnover costs, insurance costs, 
down-time costs, and fines. In addition there are 
indirect benefits such as improved reputation and 
the ability to meet shipper price and service 
requirements. These same direct and indirect costs 
and benefits apply to Mexican carriers. As existing 
agreements between U.S. and Mexican carriers 
expire, the possibility exists that U.S. carriers will 
seize the opportunity for increased business if there 
is a shortage of Mexican carriers that meet required 
safety standards. Perhaps there has been 
insufficient effort made to emphasize the importance 
of safety to the bottom line performance of the 
carrier.
Viewing the market from the side of the shipper also 
illustrates the impact that market forces have on a 
carrier's motivation to maintain high safety 
standards. As Mexican shippers become more 
sophisticated and aware of what it takes to compete 
on a NAFTA-wide basis, the importance of 
transportation in the total logistics effort will become 
apparent. Shippers can not, and will not, accept the 
level of service that is provided by carriers that are 
unable to maintain the prerequisite levels of safety
performance. Trucks which are placed out-of-service 
are less likely to provide the damage-free, reliable, 
on-time service that shippers operating in time 
sensitive environments require. Using unreliable 
carriers would result in increased shipper costs due 
to the need to carry higher inventory levels, 
stock-outs and/or manufacturing interruptions. In 
addition, as part of an integrated logistics program, 
core carriers must be able to serve all of a shipper's 
transportation needs, including cross-border 
movements. In order to provide that service, the 
carrier must meet the most stringent reliability 
standards.
The realities of the market are that a carrier must be 
competitive and capable of meeting shipper needs. 
The market values high safety standards because of 
the effect on operating efficiencies, e.g. time and 
profits. The government values high safety 
standards because of the effect on public safety and 
the integrity of the national infrastructure. Carriers 
that do not meet these requirements will not be able 
to operate profitably and thus will not remain in 
business.
SUMMARY
The combination of stringent government 
enforcement of safety standards and demand from 
the market for damage-free shipments delivered on 
an on-time basis provides the most effective means of 
promoting carrier attention to safety. The drop in 
the out-of-service rate for U.S. trucks from an 
average of 40% to an average of 28% in the past ten 
years can be attributed to this effect. It may be time 
for motor carriers and shippers from both sides of the 
border to take a leadership initiative, promoting the 
free flow of goods throughout North America. The 
market can serve to enforce safety requirements in 
conjunction with governmental efforts. As high 
safety standards provide a vital component of 
profitable operations, carriers will be motivated to 
maintain those standards to satisfy both 
governmental regulations and shipper demands. 
Those carriers who cannot remain competitive, 
meeting shipper demands at a profit, will not be 
tolerated in the marketplace. An understanding of 
this linkage between the efforts of the government 
and the market may provide a new perspective on 
the decision of whether or not to extend the free flow 
of truck operations to the ten border states and 
eventually all of North America and beyond.
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